“You’re welcome to believe that Vitamin K was the answer,”.

No, wasn’t arguing it was. I was genuinely interested to know what Sean had to say.

Just as I’m interested to know your reasoning. You seem to be arguing with the wisdom of hindsight in the light of what happened to Scott’s polar party. Fair enough if so, and I did the same with the issue of the dogs, although if Scott availed himself of knowledge available, he would have relied on dogs too – so it wasn’t just hindsight.

I’m just intrigued, seeing you have made the emphatic statement Scott should have turned back with Teddy Evans, what specific knowledge was available to him that should have led him to that conclusion.

But if you you can’t be arsed answering, fair enough.

You’re welcome to believe that Vitamin K was the answer, but you’ll be the only one. I can’t be arsed arguing with you.

“…it was obvious that they weren’t going to make it there and back safely. It was obvious to Oates and Wilson, and probably the others in the party, and it was probably obvious to Scott as well except we will never know”.

Umm. What can you cite to show it was “obvious”, instead of just a few diary entries. If it is “obvious”, then it should be straight-forward to catalogue the reasons…

“Probably right where Teddy Evan’s party turned back.”

Why?

Ok. Thanks

All I am saying is that too much Vitamin K does not have the effects mentioned in the relevant post. I am not otherwise joining in the debate on what caused the death of the expedition.

“He also needed to give up sooner than he did, especially considering that at least two of his party thought that he’d get them killed. But that would have taken a realisation that he was wrong”.

Hmm. Those thoughts were privately expressed in diaries, and certainly weren’t said directly to Scott’s face – where they would have been interpreted as mutiny, as it was when Johansen (with good reason!) expressed exactly that sentiment to Amundsen – and he was left back at the Bay of Whales as a result.

And even after Teddy Evans’ team turned back, and right up until Scott’s team reached the Pole, there was no “obvious point” where they should have turned back – unlike Shackleton in 1909 when it was obvious they would run out of rations if they continued just 97 miles from the Pole. Instead, other than a delay of about a week at the bottom of the Beardmore Glacier on the outward journey, and taking into account Scott was using Shackleton’s 1908-09 journey as the template, Scott reached the Pole right on schedule.

Put it this way: Where was the exact point at which it was “obvious” they should have turned back?

The accusation is that Scott was incompetent. But that accusation requires that Scott should have known beforehand that dogs would be the better choice. That was only found out by experience, being wise after the fact does not change the quality of Scott’s decision making with the information at hand.

He also needed to give up sooner than he did, especially considering that at least two of his party thought that he’d get them killed. But that would have taken a realisation that he was wrong.

“The accusation is that Scott was incompetent. But that accusation requires that Scott should have known beforehand that dogs would be the better choice”.

But Amundsen was certain of that before the event, and it was a certainty based on his year’s of experience.

Despite being advised on the matter by Amundesen’s mentor, Nansen, Scott ignored the knowledge that was available

“How can you say Amundsen used the “right” method?”.

Pretty easy: “Wisdom is known by her children”.

One used only dogs and won the race and lived to tell the tale,

You’re missing the point.

The accusation is that Scott was incompetent. But that accusation requires that Scott should have known beforehand that dogs would be the better choice. That was only found out by experience, being wise after the fact does not change the quality of Scott’s decision making with the information at hand.

I find Ranulph Fiennes’ account of Scott’s expedition a worthy read for context of the times; made me re-think a lot of my thoughts.

In Apsley’s ‘Worst Journey’ I think he said it was so cold if one opened one’s mouth the blast of -60 into what is around +36 cracked one’s teeth…

So one kept one’s mouth shut.

“That our NZ base at Antarctica is named after him, is a fitting tribute to that incredible man”.

Indeed.

However, while Fiennes did much to correct much of the carping criticism Huntford first made of Scott, all his critique and support of Scott is predicated on what you do if you decide to use man-hauling as the primary mode of transport.

Which was the fatal error when Scott’s margins were proved too tight when the out-of-statistical cold snap struck – but then Scott had little data to know what was beyond the statistical norm anyway!

Ponies as a relief for the later man-hauling meant Scott had to leave for the Pole at least two weeks later than Amundsen with his dogs, and by the time he reached the Pole, Amundsen was almost back at the Bay of Whales, safe from harms way.

“How can you say Amundsen used the “right” method?”.

Pretty easy: “Wisdom is known by her children”.

One used only dogs and won the race and lived to tell the tale,

…while the other, who used different modes of transport, ponies (all shot by the time they reached the bottom of the Beardmore on the outward journey), tractors (one ended up on the bottom of McMurdo sound when it was unloaded, and the other two soon broke down on the outward journey), man-hauling (used by Scott for five sixths of his journey, thus contributing to his need for greater rations than Amundsen), and only dogs as a last minute auxiliary (where they proved their worth, in contrast to Scott’s amateur attempts and the incorrect conclusions he drew on his first 1902-1905 expedition),

…and came second and died.

But Shackleton, for all his undoubted genius, made the same mistakes re dogs.

“The only reason the Scott party did not reach one ton depo was because the blizzard lasted days and days at a critical moment. ”

Uh huh. And at almost exactly the same time, Amundsen, whom Scott was in a race to the Pole with, was docking in Tasmania, and preparing to telegraph to the world that he had reached the South Pole.

Which raises the question, “Why was Scott still out on the barrier, where he could be struck, and fatally stalled by a sudden, unexpected, and beyond the normal cold snap?

Also note “cold snap”, not “blizzard”, which can and do only last a maximum of about four days in Antarctica, and contrary to Scott’s diary entry there could not had been one for about 9 days – see Susan Solomon’s “The Coldest March” which is favourable to Scott on other matters to confirm that point. Blizzard or no, Scott had frost bite by that stage, and what little chance Wilson and Bowers had of making One Ton Depot, they passed up on to die with Scott.